C an we continue to hold onto the Western humanist tradition discussed by Haraway in blog dated 10th December 2011 of the human as a unique being; unique in their apabilities and abilities (Bennett and Royal p. 255). What does it mean to be human and can we differentiate between human and non-human. P. K. Dick attempts to deal with this ontological problem in a fictional post World War Terminus Earth (p. 5). Here the main protagonist, bounty hunter, Deckard administers the ‘Voigt–Kampff Empathy Test’ (p.26) to prove a difference exists between human and android. The test detects authentic emotion by measuring irrepressible ‘eye muscle and capillary reactions’ (p. 41) that an android cannot simulate. Empathy is unique to the human community (p. 26). This binary system that is based on empathy and that distinguishes between the ‘hunter and victim’ (ironically the victim here is the android) (p. 26) is, initially, undeniable to Deckard. This is comparable to Hayles’ definition of the difference between human and intelligent machine through her concept of the
‘embodied being’ with its complete history (refer to blog 2nd January 2012). Deckard’s moral judgement is nevertheless questioned from the outset by his wife who labels him a ‘murderer’ (p. 1). The boundaries between human and non-human become blurred for Deckard when he visits the ‘Rosen Organisation’ (p. 31), makers of the ‘Nexus 6’ humanoid robot (p. 38), to test the accuracy of the empathy test. Here he tests Rachel Rosen who correctly tests positive to being an android (p. 44). Initially Deckard accepts that it is plausible that he had been outwitted by a ‘schizoid girl’ (p. 47); an authentic human who was raised away from Earth. Empathy in this case is not; by the bounty hunters own admittance, a quality that is innate to all humans. The test could read a false positive on undetected ‘schizoid and schizophrenic human patients [who show] diminished empathetic faculty’ (p. 32). Equally the test could be administered to androids that show the ‘primary autonomic response’ (p. 40) of empathy as Luba Luft did when her ‘‘eyes faded and the colour faded from her face’ (p. 114) upon recognising the bounty hunter. The distortion of the ‘hunter’ and the ‘victim’ which drives Deckard’s growing empathy for androids undermines the western humanist tradition of the human in much the same way as Haraway’s
‘origin story’ (Please refer to Blog posted 10th January 2012.) They both express a method of deconstructing a hierarchical binary system which underpins a metanarrative.
Now that it can be seen that can Dick has challenged the view of the human as unique, an appropriate question to ask might be the question that Wheale (1995) has asked.
‘What is the difference between a physically perfect android kitted out with memories and emotions passably like our own, and a person nurtured through the usual channels?’ (p. 102)
In this entwicklungsroman novel of development (Herman, D.,et. al., 2005, p. 42) the difference between the authentic human and the artificial personality who can give ‘a look of compassion’ (p. 138) becomes increasingly confusing for Deckard. This compassionate look can be argued is a result of artificial intelligence and would be expected to be as a result of artificial intelligence. Nevertheless humans too express emotion through a mechanical device resulting in simulated emotions. The fundamental principle of the ‘Penfield artificial brain stimulation’ (p. 5) or ‘mood organ’ (p. 1), as it is colloquially known, is to promote good mental health. A concerned Deckard reminds Iran that her self-imposed depression defeated the ‘whole purpose’ of the ‘mood organ’ (p. 2). In fact it seems to have a setting for every emotion that can be imagined; even a setting that makes the user ‘want to dial’ a setting (p. 4). Humans ‘rely heavily’ on this simulated emotion to function ‘normally’. Comparatively there is no difference between the androids ‘kitted out’ with emotion and a human as they both experience artificially simulated emotion. The same conclusion can be arrived at when comparing the androids expression of their want to be an autonomous self with the human’s expression of autonomy. The androids communicate their survival instinct through killing their masters to gain freedom and independence (p. 142). Similarly, the authentic human emigrates to settlements on other planets to survive the external forces of the fallout (p. 14). Both employ a basic survival technique of fight or flight. Both human and android also express their need for autonomy through the formation of alliances; they live within communities for mutual benefit and protection. The humans ‘take heart in their mutual presence’ (p. 13) for much the same reason as three of the androids group together in the same apartment block because ‘that way [they] can help each other’ (p.136).
The traditional ways of thinking about being human have been challenged; ontological truths are fluid and permeable. There has been an overlap of the organic and the artificial; between the human and the non-human. The difficulty in distinguishing between the ‘humanoid’ (p. 27) robot and a genuine human may be because the android has been created in the image of its maker. Nevertheless the symbiotic relationship that they both share only compounds the distorted
boundaries. They are not human and they realise as much, moreover, they do not want to be human, Luba Luft reflects ‘My life has consisted of imitating the human (p. 116). This statement from Luft makes it clear that the android associates itself as having a life of its own, it is an autonomous self. To have a life implies some level of ontological awareness; they see themselves as different ‘it’s our goddamn superior intelligence’ (p. 144). The androids discuss their own existentialism; they are conscious of being non-human ‘obviously we can’t live among humans’ (p. 144). The big question is what is the future of the human when the artificial body becomes increasingly difficult to tell apart from the ‘embodied being’ (p. 268, Herman, D., et. al., 2005). As discussed in previous blogs Hayles argues that we have become posthuman and similarly Hood demonstrated that the technology to create a ‘posthuman’ is here, we are capable of engineering ourselves. The machine is playing a growing part in our reality; it is deconstructing or maybe it is reconstructing our sense of being, just as it did for Deckard. His position at the beginning of the novel is in stark contrast to his position at the end ‘This planet could have used her this is insane’ (p. 118). The fear of the concept of the posthuman as the ‘other’, derives from the machines autopoietic self; it is capable of self-reproduction ‘a thing that if killed gets replaced by another replacing it’ (p. 138). As Haraway states the cyborg of fiction influences our reality and has become a part of our reality. With statements from a fictional android such as ‘it’s our goddam superior intelligence’ there is no wonder that there is fearful suspicion surrounding the posthuman. It challenges our ontology as an epilogue to the human race.
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